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3 
Passive Acknowledgement or Active Promotion of 
Religion? Neutrality and the Ten Commandments in 
Green v. Haskell 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Green v. Haskell, the Tenth Circuit considered whether the 
Haskell County Board of Commissioners’ decision to approve a 
private citizen’s request to erect a monument inscribed with the Ten 
Commandments on the lawn of the county courthouse violated the 
Establishment Clause.1 With reasoning based primarily on Justice 
O’Connor’s “Endorsement Test,”2 the court found that under the 
unique circumstances of the case, a reasonable observer would view 
the government’s decision to allow the display of the Ten 
Commandments as having the “principle or primary effect of 
endorsing religion,” and thus the display violated the Establishment 
Clause.3
This Note argues that the Tenth Circuit erred in finding that the 
monument in Haskell County violated the Establishment Clause. 
The Tenth Circuit failed to apply the controlling precedent of Van 
Orden v. Perry
 
4 to find that the monument in Haskell County was a 
constitutionally acceptable, neutral acknowledgement of the religious 
history of this nation. Instead, the court incorrectly distinguished 
Van Orden both by using an unrealistic “reasonable observer”5
Haskell County, located in Southeastern Oklahoma, has a small 
population of about 15,000 people.
 
standard requiring a clear secular purpose for the erection of the 
monument, and by incorrectly attributing the divisiveness 
surrounding the lawsuit to the unconstitutional effect of the 
monument.  
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
6
 
 1. 568 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 2. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984). 
 3. Green, 568 F.3d at 799. 
 4. 545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
 5. Green, 568 F.3d at 799. 
 The courthouse is located in 
 6. Green v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1274 (E.D. Okla. 2006), 
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Stigler, the county seat, and is situated in the middle of a square 
block of county property, which also contains a rustic cabin for the 
Haskell County Historic Society, a gazebo used for activities ranging 
from political rallies to symphonies, and a lawn where a number of 
public and private events take place. The lawn contains a number of 
marble monuments “spread willy-nilly,” which were mostly paid for 
and erected by private citizens of Haskell County.7
Although no written policy exists regarding the types of 
monuments allowed to decorate the lawn, the theme of the 
monuments could arguably be construed as relating to the historical 
significance of Haskell County and the United States in general.
  
8 
The largest monument, situated directly in the center of the lawn, 
honors Haskell County citizens who died in World War I and World 
War II.9 There are also smaller monuments including one that 
honors those who were killed in action in Vietnam and Korea; a rose 
garden with a bird bath; a flag pole with the American Flag; a large 
monument for the Choctaw Nation; two marble benches dedicated 
to and inscribed by the local high school classes of 1954 and 1955; 
white billboards with advertisements for various churches; a section 
for “personal message” bricks from private sponsors; and, of course, 
the recently added monument displaying the Ten Commandments.10
The plans for the addition of the Ten Commandments 
monument began in 2004 when a private citizen named Mike Bush 
attended a regularly scheduled meeting for the Board of County 
Commissioners and asked for permission to erect a monument with 
the Ten Commandments.
  
11 Mr. Bush said that he would take care of 
all expenses for the project.12 The Board discussed the historic 
aspects of the project, but it did not discuss any religious aspects of 
the decision to allow the monument’s erection.13
 
rev’d sub nom. Green v. Haskell County Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. at 1275 (“The lawn monuments have no apparent central theme to the amateur 
eye. One could argue that they all have some tenuous connection to the history of Haskell 
County.”). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 1276. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 Mr. Bush was 
granted permission, and he proceeded to design the monument and 
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raise funds for the project.14 As an afterthought, Mr. Bush decided, 
without approval from the Board, to add the text of the Mayflower 
Compact.15 The monument was erected on the courthouse lawn on 
November 5, 2004, and an unveiling ceremony organized by Mr. 
Bush followed days later consisting primarily of impromptu religious 
speeches.16 Two of the commissioners attended the ceremony.17
After the unveiling of the monument and the initial media 
coverage, there was a period of relative calm until James Green filed 
a lawsuit on October 6, 2005, claiming that he was “offended by the 
Monument because he believes its text is presented as a mandate and 
is thus an endorsement by the government of religious matters.”
  
18 
Following the initiation of the lawsuit, Mr. Bush circulated a petition 
and organized a rally in support of the monument, and the 
commissioners made statements in support of the monument.19 The 
district court held that Haskell County did not violate the 
Establishment Clause by approving a private citizen’s plan to erect a 
monument,20 and Mr. Green appealed to the Tenth Circuit.21
In 1971, the Supreme Court decided Lemon v. Kurtzman, a 
seminal Establishment Clause case in which the Court considered 
whether programs that supplemented and reimbursed parochial 
schools for secular teachers’ salaries were unconstitutional.
 
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Secular Emphasis of the Three-Pronged Lemon Test 
22 The 
Court articulated the famous “Lemon test,” which explains that to 
survive Establishment Clause scrutiny a government action must (1) 
have a secular legislative purpose, (2) neither advance nor inhibit 
religion as its principal or primary effect, and (3) not foster excessive 
government entanglement with religion.23
 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 1277. 
 16. Id. at 1276.  
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 1279.  
 19. Id. at 1279–80.  
 20. Id. at 1296.  
 21. Green v. Haskell County Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 22. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 23. Id. at 612–13.  
 Based on this test, the 
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Court found that the programs in question were unconstitutional24 
because their “cumulative impact” involved “excessive entanglement 
between government and religion.”25 Lemon’s progeny seems to 
suggest that the purpose of government action must be exclusively 
secular and that any religious motivations warrant invalidation.26
Shortly after deciding Lemon, the Supreme Court began to 
distance itself from the rigid application of that test. For instance, 
just two years after Lemon, the Court explained that the factors 
identified in Lemon served as “no more than helpful signposts.”
  
27 In 
some cases, the Court refrained from using the Lemon test entirely.28
B. The Lemon Test Refined by O’Connor’s “Endorsement Patina”
 
Furthermore, the Court soon began to develop alternative forms of 
analysis for analyzing Establishment Clause issues. 
29
In her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, a case dealing 
with a government-purchased nativity scene on display during 
Christmas,
 
30 Justice O’Connor articulated another way of 
conceptualizing the Lemon test.”31 O’Connor explained that when 
the government endorses a particular religion, it “sends a message to 
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the 
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents 
that they are insiders, favored members of the political 
community.”32
To determine whether or not the government has endorsed 
religion, O’Connor set forth a two part analysis: first, the court must 
ask what the message was that the government intended to 
communicate; and second, the court must ask what message the 
  
 
 24. Id. at 607. 
 25. Id. at 614. 
 26. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308–09 (2000); Edwards v. 
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586–93 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56–61 (1985); 
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980). 
 27. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973). 
 28. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983) (upholding the use of 
prayer in the context of legislative and deliberative bodies based on the “history and tradition 
of this country”). 
 29. Green, 568 F.3d at 796. 
 30. 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 31. Id. at 687. 
 32. Id. at 688.  
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government actually, objectively conveyed to the community.33 If 
either the government intended to endorse or actually endorsed 
religion, based on the specific facts of the situation, then the 
government activity must be invalidated.34 O’Connor argued that 
“[e]very government practice must be judged in its unique 
circumstances to determine whether it constitutes an endorsement or 
disapproval of religion.”35
O’Connor’s test has come under heavy criticism in recent cases. 
For instance, in Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. 
Pinnette, a case dealing with private religious expression on 
government property, Justice Scalia rejected O’Connor’s 
endorsement test and argued that it supplied “no standard 
whatsoever.”
 Thus it is necessary to closely analyze the 
specific context and audience of each case to determine whether the 
message sent by the government had the effect of endorsing religion. 
36 Scalia argued that if the factually nuanced inquiry of 
endorsement was used to scrutinize every neutral acknowledgment 
of religion in a public forum, then officials would be forced “to 
weigh a host of imponderables,”37 such as how close to the building 
was too close, what kind of building is being considered, what was 
the specific context, what symbolic messages could be drawn, etc.38 
Thus, rather than require policy makers and government officials to 
embark on a dizzying factual analysis of many degrees, Scalia 
advocated a test that focused on the neutrality of the access to the 
government property.39 Though this test is not directly applicable to 
the context of Ten Commandment monuments post Pleasant 
Grove,40
 
 33. Id. at 690. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 694. 
 36. 515 U.S. 753, 768 (1995).  
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 770. 
 40. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1129 (2009) (finding that a 
permanent monument in a public area represents “a form of government speech” as opposed 
to the private speech in Pinnette).  
 this test illustrates how the Court moved away from the 
endorsement patina, as well as the Lemon test, which had a strong 
secular emphasis, toward a standard focused much more on the 
neutrality of the government action.  
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C. Contrasting Government Involvement in Van Orden and 
McCreary 
In the Court’s most recent rulings discussing whether a 
government display of the Ten Commandments violated the 
Establishment Clause in the twin cases of Van Orden v. Perry41 and 
McCreary County v. ACLU,42 the Court emphasized that the 
“touchstone” for their analysis was “the principle that the ‘First 
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and 
religion, and between religion and nonreligion.’”43 The Court found 
that the Van Orden display constituted a constitutional, neutral 
acknowledgement of both the religious and historic nature of the 
Ten Commandments because, inter alia, the monument was 
inspired and paid for by a private organization, was erected amongst 
multiple other monuments with a historic message, and the 
government showed no particular preference to this monument.44 In 
contrast, the Court found that the McCreary display constituted a 
violation of the Establishment Clause because the government issued 
a legislative order requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments 
in a high traffic area, displayed the Ten Commandments in an 
exclusively religiously themed display, and demonstrated a sham 
purpose of historic education which was dwarfed by the “clear 
purpose” of advancing religious ideals.45
Thus, while endorsement tends to focus on whether any 
apparent favoritism or benefit was given to religion, the neutrality 
test focuses on the nature of the government involvement with the 
display. In determining the neutrality of government action in these 
contrasting cases, the Court seemed to focus on whether the 
government was passively acknowledging the religious and historic 
nature of the display or actively and primarily promoting the 
religious ideals embodied in the display.
 
46
 
 41. 545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
 42. 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
 43. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 860 (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)). 
 44. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681–83.  
 45. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 852–55, 857. 
 46. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 687 (identifying the monument as “passive” representation 
of the nation’s religious heritage); McCreary, 545 U.S. at 860 (finding that the “clear 
purpose” of the county was to post the Commandments, not educate). 
 The government 
involvement was measured on a spectrum ranging between the 
unconstitutional extremes of establishment and religious hostility, 
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with a constitutionally neutral range of passive acknowledgment in 
between.47
In Green v. Haskell, the Tenth Circuit determined that in this 
case, a “reasonable observer” would find that the Ten 
Commandments monument erected in Haskell County tended to 
strongly reflect a government endorsement of religion, and thus it 
violated the Establishment Clause.
 
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION 
48
The Tenth Circuit first had to determine which Establishment 
Clause test to apply in this case. The court admitted that the 
Supreme Court had “harshly criticized” the Lemon test.
  
A. Applying the Lemon Test Refined by O’Connor’s           
“Endorsement Patina”  
49 Indeed, in 
Van Orden, the Supreme Court found that the Lemon test was “not 
useful” in dealing with the passive placement of a Ten 
Commandments monument. Instead, the Court focused on the 
neutrality of government involvement with the display.50
However, since the Supreme Court had never explicitly 
overruled the Lemon test, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the test 
still “cl[u]ng[] to life,” and remained the touchstone for 
Establishment Clause analysis.
  
51 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit 
rejected the Supreme Court’s approach in Van Orden and chose 
instead to apply the Lemon test “refined by Justice O’Connor’s 
endorsement test.”52 The critical issue under this analysis became 
whether, as determined by a reasonable observer, the monument had 
the principle effect of endorsing religion.53
The Tenth Circuit explained that determining the principal effect 
  
B. Viewing the Monument’s Effect through the                                     
Eyes of a Reasonable Observer 
 
 47. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 683–84.  
 48. Green v. Haskell County Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 49. Id. at 797 n.8. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id.  
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. at 788. 
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of the monument is “predominantly” a “fact driven” inquiry.54 This 
prong of analysis looks through the eyes of a reasonable observer 
who, though not omniscient, would have access to more information 
regarding the monument than most members of the actual 
community.55 From the reasonable observer standpoint, the court 
argued that many facts particular to this case resulted in the Board 
violating the Establishment Clause. For example, in addition to 
attributing the ordinary knowledge of a member of the small Haskell 
County community to the reasonable observer, the court explained 
that the reasonable observer would be aware that Mr. Bush revealed 
to the Board his religious motivation for erecting the monument, 
and the Board shortly thereafter granted permission for Mr. Bush to 
erect it.56 The court also assumed that a reasonable observer would 
also know the exact location of the monument and its special 
relationship to other monuments.57 Additionally, the reasonable 
observer was assumed to know of the legal advice given to board 
members regarding the constitutionality of the monument.58 
Moreover, the reasonable observer was assumed to understand the 
significance of the contrast in the timing of the initiation of the 
lawsuits resulting in Van Orden and Green.59 Finally, the reasonable, 
but not omniscient, observer was assumed to know that the 
Mayflower Compact was added to the monument after Mr. Bush 
received official authorization and without additional approval of the 
Board.60
The court admitted that some facts weighed against the Board’s 
approval of the monument violating the Establishment Clause. First, 
“the Monument was one of numerous other monuments” and 
displays.
 
61 Additionally, the Ten Commandments were accompanied 
by the Mayflower Compact, a document with clear historic 
significance to our country.62
 
 54. Id. at 798 (citing Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1022 (10th Cir. 
2008)).  
 55. Id. at 799–800. 
 56. Id. at 801 n.10. 
 57. Id. at 800. 
 58. Id. at 800 n.10. 
 59. Id. at 807. 
 60. Id. at 801, 807. 
 61. Id. at 804. 
 62. Id. at 807.  
 The court reasoned, however, that the 
monument being one of multiple monuments would likely mean less 
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to the reasonable observer since the Haskell County display had a 
less cohesive and unifying secular theme than the display in Van 
Orden,63  and the inclusion of the Mayflower Compact would mean 
less to the reasonable observer since he or she would be aware that it 
was added without the Board’s knowledge or approval.64
The court emphasized the divisive nature of the lawsuit and 
related reactions. The court pointed to the fact that, in Green, the 
lawsuit was filed fairly quickly—almost a year after the erection of the 
monument—when compared to the lawsuit filed forty years after the 
erection of the monument in Van Orden.
 Thus, these 
facts did not mitigate in favor of finding that the monument was a 
constitutionally permissible display in the eyes of the reasonable 
observer. 
C. Divisive Reactions and a Lack of Clear Secular Purpose are Deemed 
to Create the Effect of Government Endorsement 
In its final determination that the monument’s primary effect was 
the appearance of government endorsement of religion, the court 
placed special emphasis on two particular issues: the divisive nature 
of the timing and reaction to the lawsuit, and the lack of a clear 
secular purpose for the erection of the monument.  
65 In relying on Justice 
Breyer’s lone concurring opinion in Van Orden, the Green court 
reasoned that the “years of tranquility” suggest that reasonable 
observers would not view the monument as favoring or promoting 
religion.66 The court also emphasized the fact that Mr. Bush 
organized a rally and petition to support the monument after the 
lawsuit began and that one commissioner defended it at the rally, 
saying that he would stand in front of the monument and people 
would “have to push [him] down with it.”67 The court concluded 
that these activities weighed heavily toward creating an appearance of 
government endorsement.68
The court also put significant emphasis on the lack of a clear 
secular purpose for erecting the monument. Interestingly, the court 
 
 
 63. Id. at 805–06. 
 64. Id. at 807–08.  
 65. Id. at 807. 
 66. Id. at 806–07.  
 67. Id. at 792, 801. 
 68. Id. at 801–02.  
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did not examine the secular purpose as a separate prong of the 
Lemon analysis, but rather considered it under the umbrella of the 
effect prong. For instance, the court explained that if the 
commissioners would have voiced “a secular purpose for the 
installation of the monument,” it would have made it easier for the 
reasonable observer to see that religion was not being endorsed.69 
Statements by the commissioners recognizing the religious nature of 
the monument were also deemed to increase the appearance of 
endorsement.70
In analyzing the facts of Green, the Tenth Circuit used a 
heightened and unrealistic “reasonable” observer standard whose 
knowledge and observations became indistinguishable from the 
knowledge and personal observations of the court. This standard is 
not only unrealistic—it is unfaithful to the original standard set forth 
by Justice O’Connor. The purpose of the endorsement test, 
according to Justice O’Connor, is to prohibit government from 
endorsing religion by “making adherence to a religion relevant in 
any way to a person’s standing in the political community.”
 
V. ANALYSIS 
The Tenth Circuit incorrectly held that the Board of 
Commissioners violated the Establishment Clause when the Board 
authorized a private citizen to erect the Ten Commandments 
monument in Haskell County. Specifically, the Tenth Circuit erred 
by using an unrealistic reasonable observer standard, strictly 
requiring a clear secular purpose for the erection of the monument, 
and attributing the divisiveness surrounding the lawsuit to an 
unconstitutional effect of the monument. If the Tenth Circuit would 
have adhered to the precedent of Van Orden, rather than incorrectly 
distinguishing the facts of this case, the court would have found that 
the government authorization for the erection of the monument in 
Haskell County was a constitutionally acceptable, neutral 
acknowledgement of the religious history of this nation.  
A. The “Objective Reasonable Observer” Supplanted by                       
the Court’s Own Judgment 
71
 
 69. Id. at 801 n.10.  
 70. Id. at 801–02.  
 71. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
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This analysis clearly considers real people in a real community 
who would actually feel the effect of government endorsement. 
Although a reasonable observer in a small community would be 
aware of many of the external activities relating to the monument, 
such as the unveiling ceremony, many of the more nuanced facts of 
Green that the Tenth Circuit used to distinguish the case from Van 
Orden are irrelevant because they are not something that a typical 
member of the community would reasonably be aware of.  
The Tenth Circuit attributes an excessive amount of unrealistic 
information to the reasonable observer, such as the cohesiveness of 
the theme of the monuments, or the fact that the Mayflower 
Compact was added to the monument after Mr. Bush received 
authorization for the monument and without the specific approval of 
the Board.72 The court even admitted that it was not contemplating 
an actual member of the community when it stated that “[i]n this 
inquiry, ‘[u]ndoubtedly, the “objective observer” is presumed to 
know far more than most actual members of a given community.’”73 
Although the court argues that this observer is not omniscient,74
In a misguided effort to distinguish Green from Van Orden, the 
Tenth Circuit emphasized two issues. First, the court examined 
divisive activities and statements that took place after the initiation of 
the lawsuit in Green, but not in Van Orden. Second, the court 
compared the relatively long period of time between the erection of 
the monument and the initiation of the lawsuit in Van Orden with 
 the 
court fails to identify any knowledge that would not be available to 
this omnipresent observer. The reasonable observer in this case has 
apparently degenerated into little more than the reasonable 
observations or personal bias of the court. Conversely, to uphold the 
original conception of the reasonable observer as articulated by 
Justice O’Connor, facts outside the realm of an ordinary community 
member’s knowledge must be deemed as irrelevant when 
determining the effect of the monument.  
B. Political Divisiveness: A Product of Litigation, Not Establishment 
Violation 
 
 72. Green, 568 F.3d at 808 n.18. 
 73. Id. at 800 (quoting Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1031 n.16 
(10th Cir. 2008)).  
 74. Id.  
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the comparatively short period of time between the erection of the 
monument and the initiation of the lawsuit in Green.  
First, the Tenth Circuit improperly suggested the divisive 
activities that took place after the initiation of the lawsuit in Green 
showed that the monument’s primary effect indicated an improper 
government endorsement of religion. However, in Lynch, the 
Supreme Court rejected the appellant’s argument that the 
divisiveness that ensued after the commencement of the lawsuit was 
evidence of a violation of the Establishment Clause. The Court 
explained, “A litigant cannot, by the very act of commencing a 
lawsuit, . . . create the appearance of divisiveness and then exploit it 
as evidence of entanglement.”75 Additionally, Justice O’Connor 
stated in her concurring opinion that “the constitutional inquiry 
should focus ultimately on the character of the government activity 
that might cause such divisiveness, not on the divisiveness itself.”76
Therefore, it was inappropriate for the Tenth Circuit to place 
such weight on the comments and activities that took place after the 
lawsuit began. The district court judge correctly recognized these 
activities for nothing more than products of the litigation. “The 
Monument did not begat the Rally. This lawsuit begat the Rally.”
 
77
Second, the Tenth Circuit improperly relied on the difference in 
time between the erection of the monuments and the initiation of 
the lawsuits to distinguish Green from Van Orden. Courts should be 
wary of placing weight on the timing of the lawsuit as an indication 
 
Intuitively, it makes sense that activities created by a lawsuit should 
not determine the constitutionality of the monument because many 
community members would likely have been just as defensive if 
someone had attempted to take down their World War II monument 
or the monument honoring the Choctaw Nation. Such defensiveness 
is merely a result of the offensive lawsuit, not necessarily a particular 
endorsement of any one monument, and thus it should not be used 
to distinguish the case. 
 
 75. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684–85. 
 76. Id. at 689 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Richard W. Garnett, Religion, 
Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 1667, 1670 (2006) (arguing that 
observations or predictions of “political division along religious lines” should not shape the 
constitutional content allowed by the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause, because 
political division over religion is an unavoidable, and arguably beneficial, aspect of the political 
life in a diverse and free society).  
 77. Green v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1280 (E.D. Okla. 2006), 
rev’d sub nom. Green v. Haskell County Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2009). 
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of constitutionality. Though an immediate reaction to a symbol may 
be an indication of the symbol’s unconstitutional character, such a 
reaction also may be merely the response of an overly sensitive 
individual. Likewise, a slow reaction to a religious symbol may be 
merely an indication of a less observant populace, or a populace that 
agrees with the religion being endorsed. Thus, while timing may be 
indicative of constitutionality, it is certainly not determinative of 
whether government approval of a religious symbol violates the 
Establishment Clause.  
C. Resurrecting the Secular Requirements of O’Connor’s Refined 
Lemon Test 
In Van Orden, the Chief Justice, joined by a plurality of the 
Court, stated, “Whatever may be the fate of the Lemon test in the 
larger scheme of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we think it not 
useful in dealing with the sort of passive monument that Texas has 
erected on its Capitol grounds.”78 Despite this clear statement from 
the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit determined that it was still 
“obliged here to apply the Lemon test, with Justice O’Connor’s 
endorsement patina,” which resulted in the court placing excessive 
emphasis on the requirement of a secular purpose.79
The Tenth Circuit seemed to suggest that the only appropriate 
acknowledgement of a religious symbol like the Ten 
Commandments was secular acknowledgement.
 
80 Despite the 
commissioners’ sincere acknowledgment of the historic nature of the 
monument,81 the court found that the commissioners’ recognition of 
the religious nature of the monument signaled an endorsement of 
religion.82
Of course, the Ten Commandments are religious—they were so 
viewed at their inception and so remain. The monument, therefore, 
has religious significance. According to Judeo-Christian belief, the 
 This perception was clearly negated by the Court in Van 
Orden, which stressed the importance of the dual nature of religious 
symbols.  
 
 78. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 687 (2005). 
 79. Green, 568 F.3d at 796. 
 80. Id. at 798 (“The Ten Commandments have a secular significance that government 
may acknowledge.”). 
 81. Id. at 790. 
 82. Id. at 801–02.  
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Ten Commandments were given to Moses by God on Mt. Sinai. 
But Moses was a lawgiver as well as a religious leader. And the Ten 
Commandments have an undeniable historical meaning . . . . 
Simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent 
with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the Establishment 
Clause.83
Thus, in this context, the Court distanced itself from the Lemon 
test’s requirement that a government action have a wholly secular 
purpose. As long as the government’s recognition of the Ten 
Commandments’ religious significance does not dwarf the 
acknowledgment of historic significance, as in McCreary,
 
84 the 
government does not violate the Establishment Clause by 
recognizing the dual nature of a religious symbol. To hold otherwise 
would be to relegate all sacred symbols recognized by the 
government to nothing more than purely secular displays.85
In Green, the commissioners clearly had a dual acknowledgement 
of both the religious and secular nature of the Ten Commandments, 
and the religious awareness never dwarfed the historic appreciation 
of the monument. For instance, when granting approval for the 
monument, the Commissioners exclusively discussed its historic 
nature.
 
86 Furthermore, the district court found that, whatever the 
commissioners’ views were on the religious nature of the monument, 
certainly “the Commissioners’ belief in the texts’ historical 
significance is sincere as well.”87
 
 83. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 690.  
 84. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 857 (2005). The Court in this case 
even held that a secretive religious motive is constitutionally permissible, because such a 
motive, without more, does not make outsiders out of nonadherents. Id. at 863.  
 85. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 727 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The 
crèche has been relegated to the role of a neutral harbinger of the holiday season, useful for 
commercial purposes, but devoid of any inherent meaning and incapable of enhancing the 
religious tenor of a display of which it is an integral part. The city has its victory—but it is a 
Pyrrhic one indeed. . . . Surely, this is a misuse of a sacred symbol.”). 
 86. Green, 568 F.3d at 790. 
 87. Green v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1283 (E.D. Okla. 2006). 
 Thus, the commissioners’ neutral 
recognition of the religious nature of the monument should not have 
been a factor that weighed towards a violation the Establishment 
Clause. 
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D. The Appropriate Outcome: Allowing Neutral Acknowledgement of 
Our Nation’s Religious Heritage  
The Tenth Circuit should have found that the Board’s approval 
of the Ten Commandments monument was a neutral government 
action upheld by the First Amendment. This conclusion naturally 
follows from the fact that the government’s actions in Green reflect a 
passive acknowledgement of the religious and historic nature of the 
monument, as in Van Orden, as opposed to an active promotion of 
religious ideals, as in McCreary.  
In reality, the facts of Van Orden are incredibly similar to those 
of Green. In both cases, a private citizen or group approached the 
local government seeking approval to fund and erect a monument 
prominently displaying the text of the Ten Commandments (unlike 
McCreary where the government itself initiated a legislative order 
requiring the display of the Ten Commandments).88 In both Green 
and Van Orden, the government gave approval for the monument, 
chose the location for the monument on government property near a 
government building, and sent two government officials to attend 
the dedication ceremony of the monument.89 Although these 
government actions acknowledged the religious nature of the 
monument, none of these actions gave special attention or favoritism 
to the monument. Moreover, unlike McCreary, there was simply no 
showing that any religious motivation on the part of the 
commissioners dwarfed their appreciation of the historic significance 
of the monument.90
Based on the specific facts of this case, the Tenth Circuit found 
that a reasonable observer would find the Ten Commandments 
monument in Haskell County had the unconstitutional effect of 
 Rather, the monument was given neutral 
government attention. Thus, the holding of Green should have been 
controlled by the precedent of Van Orden, and the Tenth Circuit 
should have held the government authorization of the Ten 
Commandments monument in Haskell County did not violate the 
Establishment Clause. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
 88. Green, 568 F.3d at 790; Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681; McCreary, 545 U.S. at 850.  
 89. Green, 568 F.3d at 790–91; Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681. 
 90. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 852–55, 858. 
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endorsing religion, thus violating the Establishment Clause. The 
court came to this conclusion by applying an unrealistic and virtually 
omniscient reasonable observer standard and by requiring that 
government motivations in acknowledging a religious symbol be 
clearly secular in purpose. The court further erred in over-
emphasizing the timing of and divisiveness surrounding the 
litigation. Had the court followed the precedent set forth in Van 
Orden, it would have concluded the monument was given neutral 
treatment, rather than endorsement, through the government’s 
passive acknowledgement of the religious and historic nature of the 
Ten Commandments in connection with our nation’s religious 
heritage. 
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